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NOTES
Section 2038: Present Economic Benefit v.
Technical Vesting of Title or Estates'
TiE STATUTE
Introduction
Section 2038 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, regarding revo-
cable transfers, has been unduly neglected by the periodicals, but not by
the courts.2 Tax planners are apparently keeping mum, yet the litigation
and case law are profuse and economically significant. Indeed, the
creation of an inter vivos trust, revocable or irrevocable, can scarcely be
attempted without artfully acknowledging section 2038. This note will
analyze the statute and examine in detail some problems of special
concern.
Section 2038 of the Code gathers for the gross estate the value of
all property transferred, excluding real property located outside of the
United States:
To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any
time made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or other-
wise, where the enjoyment thereof was subject at the date of his death
to any change through the exercise of a power (in whatever capacity
exercisable) by the decedent alone or by the decedent in conjunction
with any other person (without regard to when or from what source
the decedent acquired such power), to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate,
or where any such power is relinquished in contemplation of decedent's
death.a (Emphasis added.)
Assume that two inter vivos trusts were created. Trust A was created
in a jurisdiction where trusts are made revocable by virtue of state law.
In Trust A the decedent granted to himself and a corporation, as co-
trustees, certain property the income of which was to be payable to his
wife for her life and upon her death corpus was to be distributed to his
1. Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes, 326 U.S. 480 (1946), and Lober v. United States,
346 U.S. 335 (1953), have both expressly pointed out that section 2038 of the Code is more
concerned with present economic benefit than with the technical vesting of title or estates.
2. In recent years only two significant articles have appeared which probe in depth the scope
of section 2038: Pedrick, Grantor Powers and Estate Taxation: The Ties that Bind, 54 Nw.
U.L. REv. 527 (1959), and Gray & Covey, State Street - A Case Study of Section 2036(a)(2)
and 2038, 15 TAX L. REv. 75 (1959). Both, however, are principally confined to a dis-
cussion of the adequate external standard doctrine of 2038 law. The cases collected in the
services, on the other hand, are beyond counting. See generally I CCH FED. PST. & G=r TAX
REP. 5 1475.
3. INT. REv. CoDE or 1954, S 2038 (a) (1) [hereinafter cited as Code fl.
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two children. In this trust, the decedent-trustee reserved to himself the
following powers which rendered the estate taxable: (1) to revest him-
self with beneficial ownership,4 (2) to shift beneficial interests among
the designated beneficiaries,5 (3) to designate new beneficiaries,6 (4) to
shift beneficial interests among others than the designanted beneficiaries,7
(5) to accelerate beneficial interests among named beneficiaries,' and
(6) to appoint by will or to change shares by will.'
Trust B, on the other hand, was created in a jurisdiction where inter
vivos trusts are not made revocable by virtue of state law. In Trust B
the decedent created an irrevocable inter vivos trust, to be administered
solely by a corporate trustee, income payable to his wife for life, and
upon her death corpus to be distributed to his two children. By virtue of
the trust indenture the following powers were created and no tax liability
was incurred.
(1) The trustee had the sole power to revoke the trust or to return
any part of it to the grantor.1"
(2) The grantor could appoint a new trustee in the event of the
resignation of the original trustee."
(3) The grantor retained the right to be consulted in determining
investment policies.'"
(4) The grantor retained the right to make additions to corpus.'
Section 2038 provides that where the enjoyment of the property
transferred is subject to a power in the decedent-grantor to alter, amend,
revoke, or terminate at the date of his death, the value of the property
transferred is includible in the decedent-grantor's gross estate. Therefore,
any of the six powers reserved by the decedent-trustee in Trust A, stand-
ing alone, would be sufficient to render the property transferred taxable
under section 2038."4 On the other hand, the four powers created and
reserved in Trust B are not sufficient to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate
4. Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929). For a general background for
footnotes 4 through 13 see the 2038 CCH explanation in 1 CCH FBD. EST. & GIFT TAX REP.
5 1475.
5. Union Trust Co. v. Driscoll, 138 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 764
(1944).
6. Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 436 (1933).
7. Union Trust Co. v. Driscoll, 138 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1943).
8. Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947).
9. Commissioner v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 82 F.2d 157 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 552
(1936).
10. Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1 (a) (3) (1958) (hereinafter cited as Reg. ].
11. United States v. Winchell, 289 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1961).
12. Estate of Henry S. Downe, 2 T.C. 967 (1943).
13. Central Trust Co. v. United States, 167 F.2d 133 (6th Cir. 1948).
14. See cases cited in notes 4 through 9 supra.
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Trust B so as to make the property transferred includible in the decedent-
grantor's gross estate under section 2038.'" If, however, Trust B had
been created in a jurisdiction in which inter vivos trusts were made revo-
cable by virtue of state law, the entire value of the property transferred
would be includible under this section.' 6 Thus, the taxable power to
alter, amend, revoke, or terminate is not invoked under the statute when
(1) someone other than the decedent-grantor revokes or terminates;
(2) the revocation or termination is contingent upon the happening of a
certain event; (3) the alteration or amendment may take form solely
by virtue of the grantor's suggestions regarding investments or adminis-
tration; or (4) the grantor reserves the right to alter or amend by adding
to corpus. The simple distinction between the two trusts is that in
Trust A the decedent-trustee reserved for himself all of the significant
powers which could affect economic interests, while in Trust B the de-
cedent-grantor reserved for another the significant powers, only retaining
an inconsequential economic power or one that could only operate to the
advantage of the beneficiaries. In other words, these two trusts dis-
tinguish, basically, between what is and what is not a sufficient reserved
power to invoke taxability under section 2038 of the Code.
Historical Background
Prior to 1924 revocable transfers were not made specifically taxable
by statute, but from 1916 to 1924 they were gathered into the gross
estate under the possession or enjoyment section of the Code." Trans-
fers intended "to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death"
were held to embrace revocable transfers made in trust or otherwise.' 8
This statute was held to have a retroactive reach in a case decided in
1929. Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company" concerned an inter vivos
revocable trust created prior to the enactment of the possession or en-
joyment section of the Code which was effective between 1916 and
1924. When an estate tax was assessed against the trust under this
section, it was contended that the tax was unconstitutional, and void
because it was retroactive. The Court, however, held that as the power
of revocation was terminable only upon the transferror's death it would
not be complete until his death; that as the transferror was still. living
subsequent to 1916, the year of enactment of the statute, it was not
retroactive as to him. The date of death rather than the date of the
creation of the trust determined the applicability of the statute.
15. See cases cited in notes 10 through 13 supra.
16. Vaccaro v. United States, 149 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1945).
17. See discussion of sections 401 and 402 of the Revenue Act of 1921 in Reinecke v:
Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929).
18. Ibid.
19. 278 U.S. 339 (1929).
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In 1924 revocable transfers were made specifically taxable." In
1936 the statute was amended and took its present form.2' In fact there
are today two sections of the statute, section 2038 (a) (1) which is ap-
plicable to transfers made after June 22, 1936, and section 2038 (a) (2)
which is applicable to transfers made prior to June 22, 1936, and which
embodies the provisions of the 1924 statute.
The amendments of 1936 were prompted by the Supreme Court's
decision in White v. Poor,22 rendered in 1935. In that case the decedent
had created a revocable inter vivos trust with herself as one of the
trustees. She resigned as trustee, but later, upon resignation of another
trustee, she once again assumed that position by virtue of a vote made
by the remaining trustees. The Court held the trust not includible in
the gross estate on the ground that her power of control over the enjoy-
ment of the transferred property had not been retained by her but rather
had been conferred upon her by action of the other trustees.
Following the decision in White, the statute was amended in three
places." The amendment provided that the power held by the decedent
at the date of death, "in whatever capacity exercisable," to alter, amend,
revoke, or "terminate" would render the estate taxable "without regard
to when or from what source the decedent acquired such power." Later
in Jennings v. Smith24 the phrase "in whatever capacity exercisable" was
held to be declaratory of existing law rather than a substantive change.
Likewise, the word "terminate" was not held to be a substantive change.25
The third alteration, however, represented a substantial change and was
a direct reaction against the decision in the White case.
Today, transfers made prior to June 22, 1936, in which the decedent-
grantor acquires a measure of control by appointment rather than by
retention will still be governed by the White v. Poor rule.2" Transfers
made after that date, however, must comply with the statutory language
embodied in the phrase "without regard to when or from what source
the decedent acquired such power." '27 In other words, if the transfer was
made after June 22, 1936, after-acquired powers over the enjoyment of
the trust property by the decedent-grantor will render the estate taxable
under section 2038.
20. See Reg. S 20.2038-1(d) (1958).
21. Revenue Act of June 23, 1936.
22. 296 U.S. 98 (1935).
23. CoDE S 2038(a) (1).
24. 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947).
25. Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes, 326 U.S. 480 (1946).
26. CODE § 2038(a) (2).
27. CODE 5 2038(a) (1).
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The Taxable Powers: Alter, Amend, Revoke, Terminate
Where the decedent, at the date of his death, has retained the power
to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate a transfer of property so as to affect
the enjoyment of that property for the benefit of himself or another, the
value of the property transferred will be includible in his gross estate.2"
The reach of these four powers affecting enjoyment in the aggregate is
extensive, and when it is remembered that the existence of any one of
the four powers will invoke taxability under the statute, respect for the
statute is specially called for.29
These taxable powers affecting enjoyment have been held to em-
brace a wide variety of transfers. Thus, broadly classified, a transfer in
which the following powers have been reserved by the grantor have
rendered the transfer taxable: (1) the power to the grantor to revest
himself with beneficial ownership, (2) the power to shift interests among
designated beneficiaries, (3) the power to change beneficiaries, and
(4) the power to accelerate beneficial interests.
Power to Revoke
There has never. been any question about the power to revoke. In
Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company" the creation of a gratuitous revo-
cable transfer was.held taxable even before there was a specific provision
for such a tax in the Code. The tax was based on the enjoyment and
possession section of the earlier Code section until revocable transfers
were specifically designated as includible in the gross estate by the statute
of 1924.
Power to Alter or Amend
In Porter v. Commissioner"' the decedent-donor reserved to himself
the power to alter or modify the trust at any time, (he could change
beneficial enjoyment by changing beneficiaries), but expressly excepted
any change in favor of himself or his estate. The contention was made
that as the donor did not have the power to revoke the trust in favor of
himself, he could not then have the power to alter or modify (amend),
and thus the estate should not be includible. In other words, it was con-
tended that "alter" and "amend" were synonymous for "revoke." The
Court, however, held that
... the disjunctive use of the words "alter," "modify" and "amend" nega-
tives that contention. We find nothing in the context or in the policy
28. CODE § 2038(a) (1), (2).
29. Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 436 (1933). See discussion in text regarding note
31 infra.
30. 278 U.S. 339 (1929).
31. 288 U.S. 436 (1933).
19621
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
evidence by this and prior estate tax laws or in the legislative history...
to suggest the conjunctive use of these words was intended, or that
"alter" and "modify" were used as equivalents of "revoke" or are to be
understood in other than their usual meanings. We need not consider
whether every change, however slight or trivial, would be within the
meaning of the clause. Here the donor retained until his death power
enough to enable him to make a complete revision of all that he had
done in respect of the creation of -the trusts even to the extent of taking
the property from the trustees and beneficiaries named and transferring
it absolutely or in trust for the benefit of others. So far as concerns
the tax here involved, there is no difference in principle between a
transfer subject to such changes and one that is revocable.32
Thus, the power affecting enjoyment may be retained for the benefit of
someone other than the donor, and there is a distinction between the
power to alter and amend as opposed to the power to revoke. Because of
the use of the disjunctive, the presence of any one of the named powers
may render the transfer taxable.
Power to Terminate
In Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes33 the meaning of the word
"terminate," which had been added to the statute in 1936, was given
judicial interpretation. Here, the settlor had irrevocably conveyed to
himself property in trust, but he had reserved the power to terminate the
trust and distribute the principal to the named beneficiaries, his sons.
This trust had been created in 1935 before the word "terminate" had
been added to the statute as a power affecting enjoyment. The Court
held that the addition of the word was merely declaratory of existing
law and that the reserved power of termination, which was here a power
to accelerate enjoyment among designated beneficiaries, could not there-
fore escape liability from the estate tax merely because the trust was
created one year before the word "terminate" had been added to the
statute.
Testamentary Power of Appointment
The exercise of one of these powers affecting enjoyment at the time
of the decedent's death renders the transfer taxable if exercised by way
of testamentary power of appointment. In Commissioner v. Chase
National Bank 4 the decedent created an irrevocable inter vivos trust but
reserved a power to alter proportions of property which her descendants
should take. The court held the trust corpus includible in the gross
estate:
32. Id. at 443.
33. 326 U.S. 480 (1946).
34. 82 F.2d 157 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 552 (1936).
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The power she reserved was not to change the trust provisions in a
trivial way, but went right to the heart of them and gave the decedent
a substantial though qualified control over the trust property until her
death.35
Scope of the Powers Affecting Enjoyment
Furthermore, the statute is not to be considered as confined in its
reach to touching only such basic powers over economic interests, as
would be affected by a dear power to revoke or change beneficiaries or
to conclude the interests of particular beneficiaries. The line of de-
marcation between what is and what is not includible for tax purposes is
not so dearly drawn.
For example, in Commissioner v. Hager's Estate38 the decedent-trustee
retained no power to terminate, but he did retain a power to allocate
investment gains either to income for the benefit of the life tenants or to
corpus for the remaindermen. It was contended that if the retained
power was one to alter and amend, it nevertheless only encompassed a
control over certain profits made by the trust so that only the value of
these profits should be includible in the gross estate. The court held,
however, that the power here retained was certainly one to alter and
amend in a substantial sense, that the interests of the beneficiaries could
be greatly altered though not completely cut off so as to constitute a ter-
mination, and that the value of the entire estate was includible for tax
purposes.
More important in demonstrating the extensiveness of the statute,
however, is Commonwealth Trust Company v. Driscoll.7 Here, the de-
cedent-settlor deposited in trust certain securities but retained the right to
withdraw them and substitute in their place other securities from time
to time as he might deem proper. In disputing the imposed tax, the con-
tendon was made that the substitution securities would always be of equal
value to those withdrawn; thus there could be no taxable alteration,
amendment, or revocation by virtue of the reserved power. The court
found that the right to substitute was a right to alter and amend in that
there was no stipulation in the indenture requiring that the substituted
securities be of equal value with those withdrawn. Although it has
been held that additions to corpus are dearly not taxable, it is doubtful
that even had the indenture required that the substituted securities be of
equal value, a power to alter or amend would not have been found.
Had the securities been of equal value at the time of substitution,
those substituted might later decline in value to such an extent that the
35. Id. at 158.
36. 173 F.2d 613 (3d Cir. 1949).
37. 50 F. Supp. 949, affd, 137 F.2d 653 (3d Cir.), cat. denied, 321 U.S. 764 (1943).
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existence of a power to alter or amend might later be discovered by a
court.
Taxable powers affecting enjoyment have been found in a variety of
other kinds of transfers of property. For example, if a state statute makes
a transfer revocable, the value of the property transferred is includible in
the gross estate. In Vaccaro v. United States88 a husband gave his wife
an inter vivos gift which by terms of a Louisiana statute was made revo-
cable. The gift was taxable though the donor died without having
exercised his power to revoke and the property donated had been changed
in form long before the donor's death. Or again, it has been held that a
retained power, even though conditional, is taxable. In In re Field's
Estate"9 the settlor reserved the right to reduce or cancel the amounts of
gifts by trust to his wife and issue. After the death of the wife, the en-
tire amount of the trust was included in the gross estate even though the
settlor could not have exercised his retained power as to the issue, having
died without issue. Finally, it might be mentioned that an attempt to
delay the exercise of a taxable power to a period subsequent to the testa-
tor's death will not avoid the taxation. Artful drafters have attempted
to avoid the tax by providing in the indenture that revocation requires
thirty-days notice so that if the decedent died without giving the notifi-
cation, there existed at his death no taxable power.4" The Regulations
now state, however, that the powers "to alter, amend, revoke, or termi-
nate will be considered to have existed at the date of the decedent's death
even though the exercise of the power was subject to a precedent giving
of notice."'41
Transfers Not Taxable Under Section 2038
The following transfers are excluded from the estate tax by section
2038 and its appropriate Regulations: (1) transfers of real property
situated outside of the United States,42 (2) transfers by bona fide sale for
an adequate consideration in money or money's worth, (3) transfers in
which the property is not transferred by the decedent," (4) transfers in
which the decedent's reserved power could be exercised only with the
consent of all parties interested,45 (5) transfers made by the decedent
wherein the powers are held by someone other than the decedent,4"
38. 149 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1945).
39. 143 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
40. Mellon v. Driscoll, 117 F.2d 477 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 579 (1941).
41. Reg. § 20.2038-1(b) (1958).
42. CODE § 2038(a).
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Reg. § 20.2038-1 (a) (2) (1958).
46. Reg. § 20.2038-1(a) (3) (1958).
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(6) transfers made prior to June 22, 1936, wherein the decedent's power
over enjoyment is after-acquired rather than retained," and (7) transfers
wherein the decedent relinquishes his powers prior to and not in con-
templation of death. 8
In addition to the foregoing exclusions, the cases have generally held
that administrative powers over investments are non-taxable. As early
as Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company,49 the Supreme Court held that
"powers of management" do not "save the decedent any control over the
economic benefits or the enjoyment of the property."'5  In Estate of
Henry S. Downe5' the grantor reserved "the option to direct in writing
the Trustee to issue voting proxies on and to retain, sell, exchange, invest
and reinvest any of the trust property... in such manner as he may direct
and without liability to the Trustee for any resulting loss."5 The Tax
Court held that the retained power was merely a power to direct invest-
ments and as such the trust was not includible in the gross estate.
There are two other important areas wherein transfers escape the
2038 tax which will be treated separately in the following sections of
this note. They are (1) transfers made by reciprocal or crossed trusts
where there is no quid pro quo between the parties and (2) a transfer
made by the decedent when the power retained is held in a fiduciary
capacity and its exercise is governed by an adequate external standard
rather than by the discretion of the decedent.
SPECIAL PROBLEMS
Decedent's Power Held in Conjunction with Another
In Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company' certain trusts created be-
fore the Revenue Act of 1924 were held to be not includible in the
gross estate because the power of change reserved by the grantor could
only be exercised with the consent of the beneficiary. The Court held:
Since the power to revoke or alter was dependent on the consent of the
one entitled to the beneficial, and consequently adverse, interest the
trust for all practical purposes, had passed completely from any control
by the decedent which might inure to his own benefit as if the gift
had been absolute.54
47. CODE 5 2038(a) (2); Reg. § 20.2038-1(c) (1958).
48. Reg. S 20.2038-1(e) (1958).
49. 278 U.. 339 (1929).
50. Id. at 346. However, see discussion in text regarding Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74
(2d Cir. 1947).
51. 2 T.C. 967 (1943).
52. Id. at 972.
53. 278 U.S. 339 (1929).
54. Id. at 346.
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Since 1924, however, the statute has provided that the power reserved
is taxable "whether held by the decedent alone or in conjunction with
any other person." Today a power held in conjunction with a party
having an adverse interest is only taxable if the transfer in question was
made prior to June 22, 1924. Section 20.2038-1 (d) provides that
... if an interest in property was transferred by a decedent before the
enactment of the Revenue Act of 1924 ... and if a power reserved by the
decedent to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate was exercisable by the
decedent only in conjunction with a person having a substantial adverse
interest in the transferred property, or in conjunction with several per-
sons some or all of whom held such an adverse interest, there is included
in the decedent's gross estate only the value of any interest or interests
held by a person or persons not required to join in the exercise of the
power plus the value of any insubstantial adverse interest or interests
or a person or persons required to join in the exercise of the power.
Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Company"o was decided by
the Supreme Court after the words "alone or in conjunction with any
other person" were added to the statute in 1924. Here, the trust was
established in 1930, the grantor reserving the power to revoke or modify
in conjunction with the beneficiary and the trustee. The Court held the
value of the corpus includible in the gross estate and stated:
The purpose of Congress in adding Clause (d) to the section as it stood
in an earlier act was to prevent avoidance of the tax by the device of
joining with the grantor in the exercise of the power of revocation
someone who he believed would comply with his wishes.56
Decided at the same time with the Farmers Trust case was Helvering
v. Helmolz. In this latter case, the power reserved permitted the trust
to be terminated upon delivery to the trustee of a writing signed by the
settdor and all of the beneficiaries, including contingent beneficiaries
(other than testamentary appointees). The Commissioner contended
that the power here reserved was one to alter or revoke. The Court,
however, held:
This argument overlooks the essential difference between a power to re-
voke, alter or amend, and a condition which the law imposes. The
general rule is that all parties in interest may terminate the trust. The
clause in question added nothing to the rights which the law conferred.
Congress cannot tax as a transfer intended to take effect in possession or
enjoyment at the death of the settlor a trust created in a state whose
law permits all the beneficiaries to terminate the trust.58
Furthermore, section 20.2038-1 (a) of the Regulations now provides that
section 2038 does not apply
55. 296 U.S. 85 (1935).
56. Id. at 90.
57. 296 U.S. 93 (1935).
58. Id. at 97.
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... if the decedent's power could be exercised only with the consent of
all parties having an interest (vested or contingent) in the transferred
property, and if the power adds nothing to the rights of the parties
under local law.
A word of caution at this point. In the Estate of A. Frank Seltzer" it
was provided that the trust could be revoked by the consent of all of the
then living beneficiaries. Upon the death of the grantor the trust estate
was to be paid to his wife if she survived him and upon her death to the
grantor's son, if living, otherwise to the son's living children per stirpes or
their issue. If no children or issue survived, the estate was to go to the
son's spouse, if living, otherwise to a designated hospital. The laws of
Ohio, the state in which the trust was created, permitted the termination
of a trust by consent if ".... all the parties who are or may be interested
in the trust property are in existence and sui juris."6° The court held the
estate not includible for tax purposes on the ground that the trust could
not be terminated under state law, for the contingent interests could not
be determined and adjusted until the happening of certain events.
The general rule is that section 2038 applies to a power exercisable
by the decedent alone or by the decedent in conjunction with any other
person except when all parties having an interest in the transferred prop-
erty consent to the exercise of the power. The exception has two re-
quisites: (1) the consent of all interested persons must be obtained and
(2) there must be a provision of local law which would allow such per-
sons to alter the terms of the trust in any event.
Reciprocal Trusts: Decedent's Power Over Another's Transfer
Section 2038 requires that the decedent must make a transfer and
that he must retain over it one of the powers affecting enjoyment in
order for the transfer to be taxable. Where the decedent makes a transfer
and grants absolutely and irrevocably the powers over it to another, the
estate is dearly not taxable under the section." Likewise, if a decedent
merely retains a power over another's transfer the statute is not applicable
unless consideration was paid for the transfer and the power acquired."
It is because of this latter qualification that certain trusts which have the
attributes of reciprocal or crossed trusts have created problems under
section 2038.
Where clear cut reciprocal trusts are created the statute is applicable.
In Lehman v. Commissioner" the decedent created a trust made up of
59. 10 T.C. 810 (1948).
60. Id. at 817.
61. Lehman v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1940).
62. Reg. § 20.2038-1 (a) (3) (1958).
63. 109 .2d 99 (2d Cir. 1940).
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securities for his brother for life, remainder to his brother's children, the
brother to have the power to withdraw from principal at anytime
$150,000.00. In turn decedent's brother created a similar trust for the bene-
fit of decedent for life, remainder to decedent's issue, with a similar power
in decedent to withdraw $150,000.00. The court held that the decedent's
power to withdraw was a power affecting enjoyment and that since the
decedent had in reality furnished the consideration for the trust over
which he exercised a power, he was the settlor of the trust even though
it had in fact been created by another. In other words, the decedent by
paying a quid pro quo (by transferring and granting a power affecting
enjoyment to another) had in turn received a transfer and power of
enjoyment. As the decedent had bought and paid for the transfer and
power, it was in substance a transfer by the decedent with a power af-
fecting enjoyment, and as such was includible in decedent's gross estate.
Where the crossed trusts are created between husband and wife, it
may be impossible to find a quid pro quo for their existence sufficient
for tax purposes. In Newberry's Estate v. Commissioner64 the husband
created two trusts, each consisting of 2,500 shares of stock in his com-
pany, one for the benefit of his son, the other for his daughter. He and
his wife were both named trustees, but the powers affecting enjoyment
were granted only to the wife. Originally these powers were very broad
but by later amendments were limited to the shifting of economic interests
only between Newberry issue, the remaindermen. In no event could prin-
cipal or income be revested in the husband. The wife created simul-
taneously with her husband similar trusts with a similar power affecting
enjoyment vested in the husband. When the wife died, the Tax Court
held the trust over which she enjoyed a power as includible in her gross
estate under the quid pro quo principle of reciprocal trusts, the doctrine
of the Lehman case. On appeal the Third Circuit held the trust not in-
cludible.
The Third Circuit found that there was in fact no quid pro quo in
the Lehman sense. The court accepted the testimony of the husband
that he would have created his trust regardless of whether his wife had
created hers; that the ultimate purpose in the creation of both trusts was
to benefit the children and not the spouses. The court stated:
The "unity" of action of husband and wife and the "interdependent"
character of their transactions which the Tax Court found are not such
circumstances as the Lehman doctrine comprehends. Spouses in mutual
confidence and common interest work out together what each is going
to do with his own money to provide for their children. In the normal
case, which this appears to be, it is a distortion of meaning to say
64. 201 F.2d 874 (3 Cir. 1953).
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that the action of one spouse is a quid pro quo inducing the action
of the other.65
The court also felt that although the trusts were undoubtedly created
for purposes of tax avoidance and that between a husband and wife a
"bargain and exchange, within the meaning of the Lehman doctrine may
exist, yet be unprovable," that in the absence of legislation to the contrary
... when on the facts the conclusion is inescapable that each spouse
by a distinct and bona fide transaction has dispensed of his own
separate estate in accordance with his own personal desires and without
receiving a quid pro quo from the other, we think a court cannotjustifiably refuse to recognize each spouse as the real transferor of the
trust he has formally created 66
Where the quid pro quo of reciprocal or crossed trusts is definite and
provable, the estate transferred over which the decedent has a power will
be taxable. Where, however, the consideration becomes enmeshed with
love and affection the 2038 tax can be avoided.
The Adequate External Standard
The most perplexing problem that arises under section 2038 in-
volves the question of whether the power affecting enjoyment reserved
by the decedent-trustee is a power which can be exercised by him in his
absolute discretion or whether the power is one limited by an adequate
external standard. As will be shown, if the decedent-trustee has abso-
lute discretion in the exercise of his retained power, section 2038 is ap-
plicable. If his fiduciary power is limited by an adequate external stand-
ard which can be controlled by an equity court, the estate tax may be
avoided. What is and what is not an adequate external standard under
section 2038 is not a settled question, and it is in this area that tax
planners have their greatest opportunity.
In the Estate of Budlong v. Commissioner7 a power was reserved
to the decedent-trustee to invade corpus in the event of sickness or emer-
gency occurring with regard to the beneficiary. The condition precedent
had not occurred nor was there any invasion of corpus prior to decedent's
death. Sickness or emergency was held by the Tax Court to be an ade-
quate external standard governing the discretion of the trustees, a standard
which an equity court could use to compel compliance on the part of
the trustees. Furthermore, the court held that as the standard had not
been invoked by the occurrence of the contingency which it embraced
prior to the death of the decedent, there was no enjoyment of a power to
alter, amend, or revoke which would render the estate taxable. Here,
65. Id. at 877.
66. Id. at 878.
67. 7 T.C. 756 (1946).
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of course, the limitation imposed upon the power was a narrow one and
easily susceptible to equitable enforcement.
But in Jennings v. Smith6" the limitation imposed upon the powers
reserved was not so readily determinable, yet the court found it to be
an adequate external standard and excluded the tax. Next to the early
case of Reinicke v. Northern Trust Company,69 which developed the his-
toric basis for taxing revocable transfers, the Jennings decision is perhaps
the most important under section 2038. It will be considered in some
detail.
In Jennings the decedent set up two identical trusts, one each for the
benefit of the families of his two sons. The decedent together with his
two sons were the trustees of both trusts. The trusts were irrevocable
and to be enforced in accordance with Connecticut law, the decedent
retaining no beneficial interest in either trust. There were, however,
two powers of enjoyment reserved to the trustees, one over income, the
other over corpus. Income was to be accumulated and added to capital
on a yearly basis, but it could be invaded each year for the benefit of
the son or his issue if the trustees "in their absolute discretion" deter-
mined "that such [a] disbursement is reasonably necessary to enable the
beneficiary in question to maintain himself and his family, if any, in
comfort and in accordance with the station in life to which he belongs.
70
The other power reserved permitted the trustees to invade capital if the
son or his issue "should suffer prolonged illness or be overtaken by fi-
nancial misfortune which the trustees deem extraordinary."'71  Income
for the years 1935 and 1936 was paid to one of the sons, the trustees
having unanimously decided that such income was necessary to support
and maintain the son "in accordance with the station in life to which
he belongs." No other disbursements were ever made to either son
under the reserved powers prior to decedent's death.
The court followed the Budlong2 decision as regards to the doctrine
of a fiduciary power connected to an adequate external standard. There
was no problem about the invasion of corpus in the event of prolonged
illness or financial misfortune. The court merely followed the decision
in Budlong, where a similar condition was imposed, and held the limita-
tion to be an adequate external standard which could be controlled by
an equity court:
Since the trustees were not free to exercise untrammeled discretion but
were to be governed by determinable standards, their power to invade
68. 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947).
69. 278 U.S. 339 (1929).
70. Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74, 75-76 (2d Cir. 1947).
71. Id. at 77.
72. Estate of Budlong v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 756 (1946).
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capital, conditioned on contingencies which had not happened, did not
in our opinion bring the property within the reach of section
811(d) (2) [now section 2038(a) (2)]. 7 3
Then the court stated that "similar reasoning leads to the same conclu-
sion with respect to the trustees' power over net income."74  It will be
recalled that the reserved power over income permitted invasion so that
the beneficiary could maintain himself and his family "in comfort and
in accordance with the station in life to which he belongs." It will also
be recalled that income had been invaded for the benefit of the elder
of the sons, but not for the younger, and that the decedent had died in
1936. Consequently, the only enjoyment subject to a change at de-
cedent's death under this limitation was the power to invade income for
the year 1936 for the benefit of the younger son. The court held that
as the contingency which would invoke the limitation here concerned
had not occurred in 1936 prior to the decedent's death, the income for
that year was not includible in the decedent's gross estate. In effect,
then, both limitations were held to be adequate external standards which
could be controlled by an equity court. The powers reserved were not
discretionary with the trustees.
Thus, when the power to invade income or corpus is governed by
determinable standards of support and the contingency which would
justify such an invasion has not occurred prior to the decedent's death,
the reserved power over enjoyment is not in fact exercisable at the time
of the decedent's death and the transfer is not taxable.
A host of decisions followed Jennings in which a wide variety of
outside determinable standards were created and found acceptable. In
Wilson v. Commissioner75 the decedent was not a trustee, but he re-
tained the right to change the trustee at his discretion. The power over
enjoyment held by the trustee was to accelerate payments of interest or
principal in case of need for educational purposes, illness, or for any other
good reason. The court held that the decedent had no power to termi-
nate the trust, that the limitation was governed by an adequate external
standard, and that thus the estate was not taxable. In the Estate of Rob-
ert W. Wier"6 the Tax Court held the limitation sufficiently connected
to an outside determinable standard where distributions of income or
corpus could be made for "education, maintenance and support" and "in
the manner appropriate to the beneficiary's station in life." Likewise, in
the Estate of John A. Lucey77 the limitation providing for the invasion
73. Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74, 77-78 (2d Cir. 1947).
74. Id. at 78.
75. 13 T.C. 869 (1949), aff'd, 187 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1951).
76. 17 T.C. 409 (1951).
77. 16 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1002 (1947).
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of corpus in the event of accident, illness, or other emergency was found
acceptable.
Certain limitations on reserved or retained powers have, however,
not been found adequately connected to an external standard. In Hurd
v. CommissionWr78 the decedent created a trust with himself and wife as
trustees authorizing the trustees to invade corpus for the benefit of the
wife if the "circumstances so require." In this case the decedent became
incompetent before his death but was never removed as trustee. The
court conceded that the decedent might have been limited by his incom-
petency, but that the incompetency could not affect the exercise of the
retained power, for under the law of Massachusetts he could have been
removed so that the power could have been exercised by another under
the auspices of an equity court. With regard to the limitation, the court
stated:
The word "circumstances," as used in the trust instrument, is as wide
as the world and to say that it imposes a legal limitation, or imports a
controlling contingency, is to stretch it far beyond good sense. We en-
tertain grave doubts that an equity court would harken to the com-
plaints of a disaffected cestui who might interpose objections to the
decedent's invasion of the principal for the use of his wife, irrespective
of the "circumstances".... The clause is not restricted to "her" circum-
stances, but rather to "the" circumstances. It is difficult to think of
a much broader reservation of powers than that contained in Clause III
[of the trust]. 9
I
Likewise, other similar standards have been found inadequate: pay-
ment of such income as the trustees deemed necessary for the beneficiary's
best interests,"0 payment of principal as the trustees considered "suitable
and necessary in the interests and for the welfare of such beneficiary,""1
and income to be "accumulated or distributed in the sole discretion" of
the trustee.8"
Thus, it can be seen that retained powers to invade income or corpus
are attached to an adequate external standard if made for purposes of
education, support, maintenance, or a fixed standard of living. Con-
versely, retained powers dependent upon a standard required by circum-
stances, best interests or welfare of beneficiary, or sole discretion of the
trustee are not adequately connected to an outside determinable standard
which can be enforced by equity. The support and maintenance powers
of enjoyment have the effect of making the decedent-trustee a ministerial
officer of the equity court while the powers held which do not meet
78. 160 F.2d 610 (1st Cir. 1947).
79. Id. at 612-13.
80. Estate of Cyrus C. Yawkey, 12 T.C. 1164 (1949). The case was, however, decided
under section 2036.
81. Estate of Albert Nettleton, 4 T.C. 987 (1945).
82. Estate of James D. McDermott, 22 P-H Tax Ct. Mer. 450 (1954).
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the adequate external standard give to the decedent-trustee such wide
discretion that his transfer is taxable under section 2038. This dis-
tinction has been criticized as violating both the intent of section 2038
and the substantive law of trusts.' It is contended that section 2038
taxes all powers to change beneficial interests, including powers retained
by the grantor as a trustee. Furthermore, fiduciary powers held subject
to an outside determinable standard, according to the Restatement of
Trusts,8" do not take away all discretion from the trustee; in fact such
powers may embody great discretion. Conversely, fiduciary powers not
subject to a specific outside standard are not all discretionary with the
trustee, but rather are still under the control of equity. Perhaps the
proper question to be answered is not whether there is an outside de-
terminable standard but whether there is in fact real discretion in the
trustee.
It might also be mentioned at this point that in a recent decision,
State Street Trust Company v. United States, 5 the First Circuit by
implication has challenged, for the first time, the adequate external
standard doctrine advanced by the Jennings case. In the State Street
Trust case the grantor retained several administrative powers previously
exempt from taxation: power to classify receipts as income or corpus,
power to deduct depreciation or amortization, power to invest in high
yielding securities, and power to exchange one kind of property for an-
other. The powers were'to be exercised for the beneficiaries' comfortable
maintenance and support. The court held the estate includible, not
under section 2038 but under section 2036:
Perhaps no single power conferred by the decedent on the trustees would
be enough to warrant inclusion of the corpora of the trust in his estate.
But we believe that the powers conferred on the trustees, considered
as a whole, are so broad and all inclusive that within any limits a Massa-
chusetts court of equity could rationally impose, the trustees, within the
scope of their discretionary powers, could very substantially shift the
economic benefits of the trusts between the life tenants and the remain-
dermen. We therefore conclude that under the trusts the decedent as long
as he lived, in substance and effect and in a very real sense, in the lan-
guage of § 811(c) (B) (ii) [now section 2036(a) (2)], 'retained for
his life ... the right ... to designate the persons who shall possess or
enjoy the property or income therefrom ... ,%
The dissenting opinion would have held all of the retained powers non-
applicable under the Jennings decision. The point is that although the
case was decided under section 2036, the court is looking at the actual
83. See Pedrick, Grantor Powers and Estate Taxation: The Ties that Bind, 54 Nw. U.L.
REV. 527 (1959).
84. REsTATEmENT (SEcoND), TRusTs § 128, comment e (1957).
85. 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959). See generally Pedrick, Grantor Powers and Estate Taxa-
tion: The Ties that Bind, 54 Nw. U.L REv. 527 (1959).
86. State Street Trust Co. v. United States, 263 F.2d 635, 639-40 (1st Cir. 1959).
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discretion conferred in the retained powers rather than at the adequate
external standard of comfortable maintenance and support. It is true
that discretion is found in the over-all battery-like effect of the aggregate
of these administrative powers rather than to the effect of any single
power which if present alone might well have fallen under the Jennings
rule. The decision in State Street Trust intimated that the emphasis
might shift from a consideration of the adequacy of the imposed standard
to the reality of the discretionary power.
No such shift has yet occurred. In the most recent case in which
the issue arose of whether the powers reserved were discretionary or
determinable by an adequate external standard, the issue was avoided
on the ground that the powers reserved were conferred on a non-grantor
trustee. In United States v. Winchel 87 the grantor created a trust and
appointed a corporate trustee to pay her income from the principal for
life with a power reserved to the trustee to invade capital not exceeding
$20,000.00 which the trustee in its absolute discretion might deem
necessary for her comfort or to help her in meeting emergencies. A
series of administrative powers were reserved to the trustee: to sell and
transfer securities, to appraise assets, to determine questions regarding
income and principal, and to exercise conversion and subscription rights
in connection with any securities. The grantor in this case was not a trus-
tee, but she did retain two significant powers: ( 1 ) the right to confer ad-
ditional powers on the trustee and (2) the right to appoint a successor
trustee in the event of resignation of the first appointed trustee. The
Commissioner contended that the right to confer additional powers fell
within the purview of a power to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate.
The court held that such a right was limited to conferring only manage-
ment and administrative powers, but that as the power could only be
conferred on a trustee other than the grantor, the grantor did not, in
effect, retain a power affecting enjoyment, and the estate was not in-
cludible. The court also stated that the grantor's power to appoint a
successor trustee was dependent upon the resignation of the original
trustee and that as this contingency had not occurred prior to decedent's
death, such a power to appoint was not one affecting enjoyment. It
was not, in other words, such a power that could connect the grantor
with the office of trustee so as to bring the retained power of the grantor
"to confer additional powers" within the confines of a taxable power to
alter, amend, revoke, or terminate. Thus, the trust was not includible
for tax purposes on the ground that the grantor was not a trustee. The
question remains, however, whether the power to confer additional ad-
ministrative and management powers in addition to those already reserved
87. 289 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1961).
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